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Abstract 
The “geo-encryption” or “location-based 
encryption” is a security algorithm that 
limits the access or decryption of information 
content to specified locations and/or times. 
This algorithm does not replace any of the 
conventional cryptographic algorithms, but 
instead adds an additional layer of security to 
exist stack. GSM is chosen as a case study to 
implement geo-encryption in its key generation 
part due to its many properties that are 
beneficial to this protocol. GSM's BTSs are 
distributed across the network and their signal 
can reach places like urban canyons and indoor 
environments inside the network.
In GSM, data stream between mobile 
subscriber (MS) and BTS is encrypted by 
A5 encryption algorithm. A5's encryption 
and decryption key (kc) is generated base on 
MS's SIM card parameter (ki) and a random 
number, RAND. In the symmetric ciphers its 
better to use transient key instead of constant 
key for this at this project we have used MS's 
location information to generate this key by geo-
encryption algorithm idea. Encrypted data only 
in the MS's location, that just GSM network is 
aware of it, can be decrypted and its accuracy 
depends on used positioning algorithm.
Keywords: GSM, Geo-encryption, Kc, Ki, 
MPC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inserting an additional layer of security to 
the standard security stack that provides 
assurance that the secure content can 
only be used at authorized (desired) 
location and time is the main concept of 
geo-encryption. The term “location-based 
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encryption” or "Geo-encryption" is used 
to refer to any method of encryption 
wherein the cipher text can only be 
decrypted at a specified location. If an 
attempt is made to decrypt the data at 
another location, the decryption process 
fails and reveals no information about the 
plaintext [1]. 
A guiding principle behind the 
development of cryptographic systems 
has been that security should not depend 
on keeping the algorithms secret, only 
the keys. This does not mean that the 
algorithms must be made public, only 
that they be designed to withstand attack 
under the assumption that the adversary 
knows them. Security is then achieved 
by encoding the secrets in the keys, 
designing the algorithm so that the best 
attack requires an exhaustive search of 
the key space, and using sufficiently long 
keys that exhaustive search is infeasible 
[2]. 
Making key depended on target 
geographical properties is an effective 
way to strengthen its safety in the real-
time applications. The device performing 
the decryption determines its location 
using some sort of location sensor, for 
example, a GPS receiver or some other 
satellite or radio frequency positioning 
system such as MS's positioning in 
GSM. GSM is chosen as a case study to 
implement geo-encryption due to its 
many properties that are beneficial to this 
protocol. GSM Base Transceiver Stations 
(BTS) are distributed across network and 
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properly cover the area and their high 
power signal can reach places like urban 
canyons and indoor environments. 
In order to function, serving MS and 
route calls, this technology requires the 
service provider to know the cell in which 
a MS is present. These cells are of varying 
size, from a few kilometers in low-density 
areas, to a few meters within cities. This 
gives service providers a record of the 
location and movement of each device, 
and probably its owner [3].
In this paper, a new location depended 
encryption key generation management 
mechanism is introduced, and its 
applicability in GSM is evaluated. For this 
we use GSM MS's positioning method- 
Cell ID, Sector ID and TA- to calculate 
MS's location and it is participated in the 
key generation mechanism.
The structure of this paper is as follows. 
The paper first describes how the geo-
encryption builds on conventional 
cryptographic algorithms and protocols 
and provides an additional layer of 
security. The paper then discusses the 
properties of GSM and its security 
structure, which are robust for geo-
encryption approach. The paper then 
provides a discussion of MS positioning 
and its implementation on GSM.
II. geO-eNCRypTION 
pRINCIpleS
Basically, Geo-encryption builds on 
established cryptographic algorithms and 
protocols to strengthen it in a way that 
provides an additional layer of security 
beyond that provided by conventional 
cryptography. It allows data to be 
encrypted for a specific place or broad 
geographic area, and supports constraints 
in time as well as space. It can be used 
with both fixed and mobile applications 
and supports a range of data sharing and 
distribution policies [4].
The idea of Geo-encryption and its use 
in digital film distribution was proposed 
and developed by Logan Scott, Dr. 
Dorothy Denning, at [1]. At that paper 
they have mentioned a new solution 
for securing digital films by using 
geographical information to generate an 
additional security key, a “Geo-lock”, that 
is necessary to access the encrypted data 
or application. These files are sent through 
a public network and are accessible inside 
the broadcasting area but only at an 
especial place can be decrypted [4, 5].
At Geo-encryption, on the originating 
(encrypting) side, a Geo-lock is computed 
based on the intended recipient’s Position, 
Velocity, and Time (PVT) block. The PVT 
block defines where the recipient needs 
to be in terms of position, velocity & time 
for decryption to be successful. The Geo-
lock is then XORed with the session key 
(Key_S) to form a Geo-locked session 
key. The result is then encrypted using 
an asymmetric algorithm and conveyed 
to the recipient, as is shown the Hybrid 
algorithm of figure 1 [1].
Figure 1. Geo-encryption structure [1]
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Similarly, the algorithm may be deliberately slow and 
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production [6].   
In GSM, authentication process is performed by a challenge 
and response mechanism and for each authentication request 
AUC4 generates a random sequence - RAND- that with Ki are 
used as inputs of A3 and A8 algorithms to provide SRES and 
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A5 algorithm is used for encrypting data and preformed for 
each frame, while Kc is constant during conversation the 
frame number is changed [7]. The encryption process is 
applied only between BTS and MS, and each session key, Kc, 
would be used until the MSC decides to authenticate the MS 
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 Geo-lock mapping function 
where latitude, longitude and time 
constitute the inputs. Here, a regular grid 
of latitude, longitude and time values 
has been created, each with an associated 
Geo-lock value [1].
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A5 algorithm is used for encrypting data 
and preformed for each fr me, while c 
is constant during conversation the frame 
number is changed [7]. The encryption 
process is applied only between BTS and 
MS, and each session key, Kc, would be 
used u til the MSC ecides to authenticate 
the MS again which might takes days [8].
a. analyzing gSm cryptography
Basically GSM cryptography structure is 
based on authentication and its security 
has s me vulnerability such as:
• Kc is produced based on Ki, so if 
some body xtracts i from a SIM 
card (under SIM lo ing attack)
and achieves RAND number 
which is sent clearly from BSC to 
BTS, will be able to calculate Kc by 
A8 algorithm. 
• The d ta stream is encrypted 
only between BTS and MS but at 
internal parts of GSM especially 
between BSC and BTS (usually 
whit radio connection links), there 
isn't any cyphering process.
• Kc is made according to each 
authentication process and is 
constant during each call.
Accordingly, Kc production based on Ki 
is the main security vulnerability factor 
of GSM (forging Ki under SIM cloning 
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 2 Home Location Register
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attack) that limits its safety. Using some 
other factors of GSM to strengthen 
encryption key during conversation is the 
main aim of this paper.
IV. mS pOSITION IN gSm 
 In the GSM, Cell Global Identity-CGI- 
indicates MS location in the network and 
is stored at the HLR. CGI (32 bit) indicates 
Location Area Identifier (LAI) and Cell 
ID:
CGI=LAI + Cell ID  
LAI=MCC+MNC+LAC
Coverage area of each MSC/VLR has 
a unique LAI code that is arranged by 
Mobile Country Code (MCC), Mobile 
Network Code (MNC), and Local Area 
Code (LAC). Each MSC is divided into 
several subareas- BSC (with a unique 
LAC). BSC area consists of some BTS 
(each BTS has a unique ID: Cell-ID) and 
depends on its designing and the number 
of antenna, each BTS maybe has several 
sectors (1 up to 6 sectors and Sector-ID) 
[6, 7].
BTS broadcasts LAI and its Cell-ID so 
that all MS under its coverage can receive 
these messages. Knowing the Cell-ID, an 
MS can approximate its actual location 
by using the geographical coordinates 
of the corresponding BTS. MS's location 
information is updated by Location-
Update (LU) process in any call setup, 
entering new MSC/VLR and regularly in 
the idle mode [7]. 
In order to avoid excessive signaling 
traffic, as long as the MS is in idle mode, 
the network knows only the LAI. The 
network becomes aware of the Cell-ID 
only when the MS switch into dedicated 
mode, namely when the channel is used 
to actually establish a call. In contrast, 
the MS always knows the Cell-ID of the 
cell it is in [3]. Selecting a BTS sector for 
connecting is based on the MS's location 
and the strength of received signal [6, 7].
Unfortunately, the GSM Network itself 
lacks positioning functionality since 
historically it was not designed to carry 
any location or telemetry information. 
But several MS positioning techniques 
have been developed and tested with 
good results but in the most of them the 
GSM network should be changed and 
needs to be equipped by some additional 
parts and so a huge costs. For example 
in several methods which accurately 
measure the time difference such that 
the Time of Arrival (TOA) or Enhanced 
Observed Time Difference (E-OTD) of 
wireless radio transmissions there are 
huge costs involved in upgrading a 
substantial part of the network’s BTSs 
with Location Measurement Units 
(LMUs) for calculating the difference 
of arrival time of signals from BTS by 
knowing the position of LMU [9]. Or in 
the Assisted-GPS (A-GPS) method each 
MS and BTS are equipped with a GPS 
receiver and calculate their position by 
GPS technology [9, 10].
The simplest way to describe the location 
of a MS that doesn't need to change the 
network is Cell ID+ Sector ID+ TA. It 
doesn’t have accuracy as same as other 
methods but makes lower implementation 
cost [11] so that we chose this method for 
its simplicity and cost.
a. Cell ID+ Sector ID+Ta positioning 
method
Cell ID+ TA positioning method uses 
Cell ID, Sector ID of corresponding BTS 
and Timing Advance (TA). TA is a crude 
measurement of the time required for the 
signal to travel from the MS to the BTS. 
In the GSM system, where each mobile 
station is allocated a specific frequency 
and time slot to send and receive data, this 
measurement is essential to make sure 
that time slot management is handled 
correctly and that the data bursts from the 
MS arrive at the BTS at the correct time (in 
the time slot allocated to them) [11]. The 
computed TA value is then used by the 
MS to advance transmission bursts so that 
the data arrives at the correct time slot. 
The resolution is one GSM bit, which has 
the duration of 3.69 microseconds. Since 
this value is a measure of the round trip 
delay from the MS to the BTS, half the way 
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would be 1.85 microseconds, which at the 
speed of light would be approximately 
equal to 553 meters. 
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(in the time slot allocated to them) [11]. The computed TA 
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one GSM bit, which has the duration of 3.69 microseconds. 
Since this value is a measure of the round trip delay from the 
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The accuracy of this method depends on the cell's size, 
since the typical GSM cell is anywhere between 2 km to 20 
km in diameter, and the number of cell sectors. Therefore, 
reducing the cell diameter or increasing the number of sectors 
can enhance its accuracy.  
V. PROPOSED SCHEME  
By using MS position parameters we try to limit decrypting 
possibility to a dedicated area. At this project, AUC uses MS 
position as a Mobile Station Position (MSP) code that consists 
of CGI (LAI and Cell ID), Sector ID and TA to generate Kc. 
CGI and Sector ID are known and broadcasted by BTS but TA 
is modified by MS movement. 
MSP=CGI+ Sector ID+ TA 
MSP consists of 64 bits; first 32 bits for CGI, 8 bits for 
Sector ID (33th- 40th), 8 bits indicate TA (41th- 48th) and the 
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The accuracy of this method depends on 
the cell's size, since the typical GSM cell 
is anywhere between 2 km to 20 km in 
diameter, and the number of cell sectors. 
Therefore, reducing the cell diameter 
or increasing the number of sectors can 
enhance its accuracy. 
V. pROpOSeD SCHeme 
By using MS position parameters we 
try to limit decrypting possibility to a 
dedicated area. At this project, AUC uses 
MS position as a Mobile Station Position 
(MSP) code that consists of CGI (LAI and 
Cell ID), Sector ID and TA to generate 
Kc. CGI and Sector ID are known and 
broadcasted by BTS but TA is modified 
by MS movement.
     
MSP=CGI+ Sector ID+ TA
MSP consists of 64 bits; first 32 bits for 
CGI, 8 bits for Sector ID (33th- 40th), 8 
bits indicate TA (41th- 48th) and the rest 
are assigned to zero (16 bits padding 
to achieve Kc’s length-64 bit). At the 
proposed structure, when MS requests 
to be authenticated, AUC products Kc by 
using A8 (Ki and RAND as inputs) and 
then XORs it with MSP. The result is K'c:
rest are assigned to zero (16 bits padding to achieve Kc’s 
length-64 bit). At the proposed structure, when MS requests to 
be authenticated, AUC products Kc by using A8 (Ki and 
RAND as inpu s) and then XORs it wi h MSP. The result is 
K'c: 
),(8 KiRANDAKc =   (2) 
MSPKccK ⊕='    (3) 
AUC generates five triple sets of {RAND, SRES, K´c} and 
sends them to HLR, BTS and MS. In the MS side, MS 
produces Kc by using RAND and Ki, calculates TA for MSP 
computing (receives Cell ID and Sector ID from BTS), then 
XOR it to Kc to compute K'c (Fig. 5 and 6). 
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The security of a key comes from the amount of entropy of 
the information that generates the key. In this case, CGI and 
Sector ID are both known, for this the entropy of MSP comes 
from TA (8 bits in the maximum distance case: 0 ≤TA≤63). 
Therefor this entropy is embedded into K'c as additional 
security by XORing MSP to Kc. Similarly, the secrecy of K'c 
same as Kc comes from Ki and MSP just generates additional 
security followed by MS’s mobility. Base on Information 
Theory the minimum entropy of x is: 
Min-entropy: H∞(X)=-log(maxX PrX(X=x)) (4) 
Message that has min-entropy k means that adversary’s 
probability of guessing the message is 2-k. Based on this, if 
MS position in the sector is a uniform random variable we 
have maximum entropy for MSP: 
HMSP=-log(PrMSP(MSP=msp))   (5) 
 
VI. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
In order to evaluation, a GSM network (with 4 cells) is 
simulated by MATLAB. Each cell consists of 3 sectors with 
4km radius (0≤TA≤ 7), MS moves with constant velocity of 
30 km/h along a cell toward its neighbor. This means it is 
moving with uniform motion.  The transferred data is a 2 
minute duration part of a conversation with 1000 frames (all 
frames are considered same with 8 bits). By this speed, each 
TA (500m) is passed by 1 minute, then at least two TAs are 
passed during any conversation, for this we limit the 
movement to these TAs in all movement modes and to avoid 
complexity we turn off hand over between sectors and cells.   
The only unclear part of MSP is TA and in this case we 
assume uniform probability for TA with PTA=1/8 and its 
maximum entropy (maximum entropy in the uniform 
probability case) is: 
HTA=-log(1/8)=3bit    (6) 
In the movement modes by changing the position, MSP is 
changed and the guessing probability is decreased by a factor 
of time and MS velocity, depends on movement mode and 
changing quotas.    
Generally, a mobile communication is classified into 4 
modes: 
• Stationary mode: 80 percent of mobile conversations 
are established in this mode while MSP is constant and 
K'c depends on Kc. The additional security (additive 
probability of guessing) is 2-3 and doesn’t change once be 
generated at beginning of conversation. 
• Intra sector movement mode: MS moves inside a 
sector and doesn’t defect it. At this mode TA is changed 
according to MS's movement and encryption process 
delayed until MS's location extracted. By going far away 
BTS, the variable part of MSP is TA and its entropy is 
same as previous mode. At the conversation in this mode 
MSP has 2 TA and the adversary has a time limitation to 
guess TA.   
• Intra cell movement mode: In this mode MS enters 
another neighbor sector. TA and Sector ID parts of MSP 
are changed, and there is a delay same as previous 
modes. Similar to second mode, MSP changes at least 
two times and the probability of key guessing is reduced. 
• Extra cell movement mode: MS enter to another cell 
and all parts of MSP are changed (TA, Sector ID and 
Cell ID) in this mode. To simplify the simulation, this 
movement is just considered from one sector to another 
sector of neighbor cell. 
The simulation's results are shown in table 1. Our main aim 
in the simulation is to evaluate applicability of the scheme and 
its time. It should be considered that ciphering duration in the 
simulation differs from real situation. It is important to note 
that in the stationary mode the longer conversation increases 
the probability of guessing encryption key, Kc, but we 
couldn't obtain an accurate relationship between conversation 
duration and key strengths, for this we estimate just based on 
key guessing probability amount. 
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AUC generates five triple sets of {RAND, 
SRES, K´c} and sends them to HLR, BTS 
and MS. In the MS side, MS produces Kc 
by using RAND and Ki, calculates TA for 
MSP computing (receives Cell ID and 
Sector ID from BTS), then XOR it to Kc to 
compute K'c (Fig. 5 and 6).
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movement is just considered from one sector to another 
sector of neighbor cell. 
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mode MS enters another neighbor 
sector. TA and Sector ID parts of 
MSP are changed, and there is a 
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reduced.
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enter to another cell and all parts 
of MSP are changed (TA, Sector 
ID and Cell ID) in this mode. 
To simplify the simulation, this 
movement is just considered from 
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The simulation's results are shown in 
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is to evaluate applicability of the scheme 
and its time. It should be considered that 
ciphering duration in the simulation 
differs from real situation. It is important 
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the longer conversation increases the 
probability of guessing encryption key, 
Kc, but we couldn't obtain an accurate 
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duration and key strengths, for this we 
estimate just based on key guessing 
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Intra sector 
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In the stationary mode MSP is constant but in the other 
modes MSP is modified synchronously with MS velocity and 
its mobility increases key’s secrecy. Thereupon, higher MS 
moving speed causes more K'c secretion but has another 
effect: decryption error. The rapid changing of TA in the high 
speed movement is the main factor of decryption error 
especially near the sector’s/cell’s borders. Additionally, in 
comparison with original method, MSP updating makes key 
generation delay and increases the encryption process time. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Using Geo-encryption in the stationary mode has same 
effectiveness but the encryption's key safety by being referred 
to MS location, becomes better. Statistically about 80% of 
mobile conversations are established in the stationary mode 
and the proposed method leads to a more strength key (with a 
factor 2-3 in the simulation) at this mode. It is essential to note 
that in the revealed Ki situation by increasing conversation 
time the encryption key becomes more revealable.  
Although in the others modes, the safety of encryption 
becomes better but because of using an inaccurate positioning 
method, MS mobility in higher speed not only increase 
encryption process delay but also decryption fault.  
In the current GSM the session parameters to encrypt data 
continuously need to be changed (frame number of the 
plaintext) while Kc is constant. In the proposed scheme the 
encryption process need to be changed not only by frame 
number but also by MS position and mobility speed. Unlike 
the current GSM that the encryption key-Kc- is constant 
during conversation in the proposed scheme, K'c, changes by 
MS position and velocity. 
In our next work we try to enhance the MS positioning 
method and will concentrate on a better positioning technique 
to decrease the decryption errors in the movement modes. 
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rapid changing of TA in the high speed 
movement is the main factor of decryption 
error especially near the sector’s/cell’s 
borders. Additionally, in comparison 
with original method, MSP updating 
makes key generation delay and increases 
the encryption process time.
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mode has same effectiveness but the 
encryption's key safety by being referred 
to MS location, beco es bett r. Statisticall  
about 80% of mobile conversations are 
established in the stationary mode and 
the proposed method leads to a more 
strength key (with a factor 2-3 in the 
s mulation) at this mode. It is essential 
to note that in the revealed Ki situation 
by increasing conversation time the 
encryption key becomes more revealable. 
Although in the others modes, the safety 
of encryption becomes better but because 
of using an inaccurate positioning 
method, MS mobility in higher speed not 
only increase encryption process delay 
but also decryption fault. 
In the current GSM the session parameters 
to encrypt data continuously need to be 
changed (frame number of the plaintext) 
while Kc is constant. In the proposed 
scheme the encryption process need to 
be changed not only by frame number 
but also by MS position and mobility 
speed. Unlike the current GSM that the 
encryption key-Kc- is constant during 
conversation in the proposed scheme, K'c, 
changes by MS position and velocity.
In our next work we try to enhance the MS 
positioning method and will concentrate 
on a better p sitioning technique to 
decrease the decryption errors in the 
movement modes.
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